Interacting Interests: Explaining President Obama´s Libyan Decision by Blomdahl, Mikael
 
European journal of American studies 
13-2 | 2018
Summer 2018








European Association for American Studies
 
Electronic reference
Mikael Blomdahl, « Interacting Interests: Explaining President Obama´s Libyan Decision », European
journal of American studies [Online], 13-2 | 2018, Online since 19 July 2018, connection on 01 May
2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/ejas/13224  ; DOI : 10.4000/ejas.13224 
This text was automatically generated on 1 May 2019.
Creative Commons License
Interacting Interests: Explaining




1 President Obama’s foreign policy has at times puzzled both critics and supporters alike.
The  administration’s  foreign  policy  has  for  example  been  described  as  “ideological
pragmatism”, as abandoning the “democracy promotion tradition” of U.S. foreign policy,
as “incoherent” and as “pragmatic realism” (Muravchik 2009; Nau 2010; Drezner 2011;
Walt 2014; Kay 2014). Since the beginning of the Arab Spring, the Obama administration
had  been  grappling  with  how  the  U.S.  should  respond to  the  democratic  uprisings
sweeping the region. One country, Libya, stood apart from the rest of the uprisings given
that president Obama confronted issues not raised elsewhere: questions about the proper
use  of  force  and presidential  power  (Mann,  2012).  Yet on March 19,  2011,  President
Obama ordered U.S.  military forces to launch Operation Odyssey Dawn (OOD) against
Libyan military targets. OOD was a noteworthy departure from the traditional pattern of
US military interventions and has been argued to be “first new war for President Obama”,
a new American paradigm of “leading from behind”, and a demonstration of President
Obama seeking to “off-load” responsibility to American allies. (Hendrickson 2013; Lizza
2011; Goldstein 2016). 
2 Initially, however, several factors worked against support for intervention and this case
underline problems of intervention amidst both domestic and international factors. At
the international level, the U.S. was in the phase of withdrawing from two unpopular
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. At the domestic political level, the administration faced
congressional  criticism,  public  war-weariness  and  financial  constraints. Given  these
conditions, combined with reluctance of the defense officials from major military powers
within NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) to become involved in Libya, there
seemed little probability for any US participation in this case (Michaels, 2014: 22). 
3 Previous research on why states participate in “humanitarian interventions” consists of a
variety  of  rival  theories,  taking  into  account  various  levels  of  analysis,  independent
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factors and causal mechanisms (Wheeler, 2000; Gibbs, 2000; Mearsheimer, 2001; Bellamy,
2004; Chandler,  2004; Glanville,  2006; Hildebrandt et  al. 2013).  Previous analysis of  the
Libya intervention has, for example, examined on the viability of NATO, humanitarian
interventions, international law, if the operation meant the implementation of a so-called
“Obama  Doctrine”  in  US  foreign  policy,  questions  of  OOD`s  constitutionality  and
ramifications  for  presidential  war  powers,  and  the  implications  of  airpower-centric
strategy for forthcoming US military interventions (Barry 2011; Drezner 2011; Jones 2011;
Hallam  and  Schreer  2012;  Hendrickson  2013;  Chivvis,  2014;  Engelbrekt  et.  al,  2014;
Michaels 2014). 
4 Hence,  previous  research  has  been  successful  in  identifying  how  different  factors
contributed to the U.S. decision to join OOD. The scholarship of the Libya intervention has
,  however,  not  accounted  for  how  a  broader  framework  can  contribute  to  the
understanding  of  this  case.  What  has  been  missing  is  a  framework  that  examine
explanatory  factors  from  a  number  of  different  perspectives.1 Another  limitation  in
previous  research  is  the  lack  of  debate  about  interaction  effects  between  different
explanatory factors. Analyses based on a combination of explanatory factors and how
they interact can, therefore, further the understanding of this significant decision by the
Obama  administration.  This  article  focus  on  the  following  questions:  what  were  the
necessary conditions behind the decision made by president Obama to participate in OOD,
and how did these circumstances interact with each other?
5 The study demonstrates that it is essential to take into account factors from a number of
particular perspectives in order to explain the U.S. decision. To start with, insights from a
constructivist  perspective  on  the  decision  making  is  required.  The  mounting  use  of
humanitarian intervention since the end of the Cold War is mainly the outcome of states
having included ethics, values and humanitarian concerns into their foreign policies to a
greater  extent  than  before  (Wheeler,  2000; Finnemore,  2003; Bellamy,  2004; Chandler,
2004; Glanville,  2006).  Hence,  according  to  a  constructivist  view,  states  can  perceive
humanitarian intervention as a moral duty to intervene in the domestic affairs of states
to protect individuals from genocide or collective persecution. The empirical analysis,
below,  illustrates  that  the  U.S.  decision  reflected,  in  part,  feelings  of  humanitarian
considerations. Thus, several central actors within the Obama administration perceived
the humanitarian situation in Libya as startling, and this view contributed to the decision.
6 In addition, it is also necessary to incorporate a rationalist perspective on foreign policy
decision making. Starting from this position, proponents call attention to various forms
of self-interest in decisions to intervene (Neack, 1995; Krauthammer, 1999; Gibbs, 2000; 
Mearsheimer, 2001; Hildebrandt et al. 2013). This literature is based on the assumption
that, even if political leaders have an inclination to help others, the actual willingness to
do so  depend on other  circumstances.  In  other  words,  if  a  potential  intervention is
perceived by the government to impact negatively on its self-interest, there will almost
certainly be no intervention. 
7 Finally, it is crucial to include an evaluation of the domestic politics of OOD. As argued by
Hildebrandt et. al, (2013: 247) “humanitarian intervention—although waged for seemingly
altruistic ends—proceeds along the same domestic political paths as other uses of force”.
If states decide to engage in humanitarian efforts, they are putting their troops, defense
budgets, and political support on the line. Thus, decisions of this kind can lead to political
crises  at  home  and  is,  therefore,  not  a  decision  that  states  make without  difficulty
(Hildebrandt, 2013: 244). The involvement of domestic political factors offers researchers
Interacting Interests: Explaining President Obama´s Libyan Decision
European journal of American studies, 13-2 | 2018
2
the  chance  to  examine  the  specific  influence  of  political  factors  on  humanitarian
intervention decision making (Redd 2005). Based on this, the article builds on a small but
growing  literature  on  humanitarian  intervention  decision  making  (Shannon,  2000;
Glanville, 2006; Ward, 2010; Hildebrandt et. al 2013; Krieg, 2013; Doeser, 2014). Thus, this
approach draws on the insight of Hudson (2005) and Yetiv (2004) that we should aim for
multi-causal explanations in foreign policy research.
8 As  demonstrated  in  the  analysis,  four  particular  circumstances  influenced  the
characteristics of OOD and acted as a major influence on the timing and scope of the
intervention (Marsh 2014a: 127). The first necessary circumstance was that some actors
within the Obama administration perceived a feeling of moral obligation to intervene in
order to help individuals in need and were not part of their nation. 
9 The second circumstance was the legal basis and international support for the use of
force, which was provided by the mandate from the UN Security Council (UNSC) on March
17. Given continued U.S. presence in Afghanistan and Iraq, a military operation absent
international  authorization and support  would be to step into a  risky situation with
unforeseeable consequences for American credibility (Chivvis,  2014:  55;  Clinton,  2014:
364).
10 The third circumstance was that public war-weariness and congressional skepticism and
reluctance affected the decision-making by excluding any form of ground troops in the
final decision. When sending troops abroad, governments want to make sure that the
decision does not impact negatively on their political power at home (Kreps 2010). One
way of doing this is to limit the risk of the intervention and the U.S. mission was intended
to be short and involving no ground troops. Thus, by limit the risk of casualties it protects
the government from electoral punishment. Hence, this circumstance provide support for
theories on the domestic politics of military intervention (Howell and Pevehouse, 2005;
Redd, 2005; Drury et. Al, 2010; Kreps, 2010; Hildebrandt et. al, 2013).
11 The fourth circumstance was that  the U.S.  could take a  supporting role  and quickly
transfer control of the operation to NATO for self-interest based reasons. A limited air
operation and quick transfer of command and primary mission responsibility to NATO
presented  the  Administration  with  a  more  cost-effective  approach  to  conserve  U.S.
strength  in  time  of  economic  crisis  and  military  overstretch.  These  findings  can  be
related to the realist perspective, which claims that material interests are always present
in the foreign policy calculations of states (Krauthammer 1999; Gibbs 2000; Mearsheimer
2001; Dueck, 2009).
12 In sum, President Obama´s decision to launch a limited air operation on Libya can be seen
as  the  result  of  a  combination of  factors:  altruism;  the  legal  basis  and international
support for the operation; domestic political constraints and the possibility to limit U.S.
participation and transfer control to NATO. The next section demonstrates through an
analysis  of  primary  and  secondary  sources  the  way  in  which  these  circumstances
influenced the U.S. decision making.2 The final section summarizes the primary argument
of the study and discusses the need for further research.
 
The Beginning of the Crises: Reluctance vs Altruism, 13 January–11 March
13 The Libyan crisis began with peaceful demonstrations against Colonel Muammar Qaddafi
in Benghazi on 13 January 2011. As the protests in Libya developed into armed rebellion
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in mid-February, Gaddafi responded with systematic attacks by air and ground forces,
often against non-combatant civilians (Domansky et. al, 2012: 2). 
14 In Washington heated debates over intervention started as soon as the revolution broke
out  (Chivvis,  2014:  6).  On February  23,  President  Obama voiced U.S.  support  for  the
universal  rights  of  the  Libyan  people  and  stated  that  the  Qaddafi  regime  had  a
responsibility  to  refrain  from  violence,  if  not,  the  regime  would  have  to  be  held
accountable (Obama 2011a). On the day after, with their citizens out of harm´s way, the
U.S., France, and Britain moved quickly to sanction the Qaddafi regime. On 26 February,
the  UNSC adopted Resolution 1970,  which imposed an arms embargo in  Libya in  an
attempt to stop the violence (UNSCR 1970). The resolution was fully supported by the
Arab League. 
15 Within  the  U.S.  administration,  President  Obama,  who  was  reluctant  to  any  U.S.
intervention, had begun a series of discussions on how to handle Libya. Yet, the question
of whether to move forward military intervention was now clearly on the table (Hastings,
2012: 286). The actors broke down into two distinct camps. On the critical side were top-
level  Pentagon  and  White  House  advisers  who  were  skeptical  of  further  military
intervention, given the continued U.S. presence in Afghanistan and Iraq (Sanger, 2012).
This group included Secretary of Defense Gates, who dubbed calls for intervention “loose
talks” (Gates, 2011a). From the outset, Gates was among the most vocal skeptics against
the proposal of a no-fly zone over Libya. On March 2, during a hearing before the Senate,
Gates said that: “Let's just call a spade a spade. A no-fly zone begins with an attack on
Libya to destroy the air defenses (…) and then you can fly planes around the country and
not worry about our guys being shot down” (Gates, 2011a). Gates pointed to US economic
realities after Iraq and Afghanistan, which were not the best.3 
16 On the other side of the division within the administration was a faction of actors within
the White House and the State Department. These actors viewed Libya as an opportunity
to enact a new form of humanitarian intervention, one they had been sketching out for
nearly a decade. One actor, belonging to this group, UN ambassador Susan Rice, had used
her  first  statement  in  the  UN  Security  Council  to  endorse  the  principle  of  “the
responsibility  to  protect”  (Rice,  2009).  Moreover,  within  the  NSC  (National  Security
Council) there were a group of staff members who joined ranks with Rice and pushed for
military intervention. These staff members belonged to a core of a White House group
that argued the case for humanitarian intervention (Hastings, 2011). One of these staffers,
Samantha Power had devoted much of her professional career to the question of how to
prevent mass killings. Alongside Rice, Power was the second senior official who had come
into the Obama administration determined to prevent any further atrocities like those in
Bosnia or Rwanda (Mann, 2014: 284-285).4 
17 The preferences of this group reflect a life-long personal sympathy for humanitarian
intervention and memories of the ethnic cleansing in the Balkans and Rwanda (Hastings,
2011; Mann, 2012: 339). This group was not so imbued with the more cautious traditions
of the State Department and the Defense Department. They strove to ensure that the
president heard alternative options from the one´s from Pentagon and the military and
viewed the events in the Middle East as a sign of a new era. Obama was thus confronted
with conflicting views within his administration between proponents of “realism”, who
urged him to stay out of Libya, and proponents of “humanitarian interventions”, who
wanted him to act (Mann, 2012: 266-289).
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18 On March 1, the USA Senate passed a non-binding Resolution calling for the resignation
of Gaddafi and the possible establishment of a no-fly zone (S.Res.85, 2011). So, in early
March, when Gaddafi´s forces began to move toward Benghazi, this group of actors began
to support the use of force if necessary to stop mass killings. Rhodes, the president´s
speechwriter,  argued  that  the  Libya  case  fit  Obama´s  own  criteria  for  humanitarian
intervention (Sanger, 2012: 342). 
19 On March 9, the president´s top national security advisors met to discuss U.S strategy, but
the official U.S. position did not change. The United States would support humanitarian
action but  nothing  more  (Carney,  2011).  Yet,  the  “interventionist”  group within  the
administration perceived that the humanitarian situation in Libya was acute and dire
(Mann, 2014; Sanger, 2012). Rice and her team at the UN began preparing a resolution
that called for international action in Libya. 
20 However, this perception by itself did not lead to the conclusion that the administration
should work for the use of military force within the frameworks of the UN Thus, feelings
of altruism on their own did not result in any attempts by the government to argue for a
military intervention. If altruism had been the sole reason for the later decision to launch
air strikes, it seems reasonable to assume that the Obama administration would have
supported the establishment of a no-fly zone more actively already in the beginning of
March. Instead the Obama administration adopted what can be called a ‘wait and see
approach’,  in  order  to  await  the  situation in  Libya and observe what  the UNSC and
Congress were up to. Altruism can, nonetheless, be seen as one of several reasons for the
final decision on March 15. Another reason is the legal basis and international support for
OOD. 
 
Resolution 1973 and International Support, 12 March-17 March
21 On March12, discussions on how to handle the Libyan crisis intensified within the UN
Security Council. Within Washington, the State Department had all along been divided on
how to act in Libya and Secretary Clinton was skeptical of any military actions (Cooper
and Myers, 2011). At first, she stuck with Gates and worried that if an intervention failed
to remove Qaddafi, or failed to gain enough international support, it would jeopardize
American credibility (Clinton, 2014: 367). 
22 From March 12,  however,  after  the  Arab League had requested action from the UN,
Clinton seemed to have decided to split from Gates and work actively for an intervention
in Libya. The rapid developments on the ground, Clinton’s traveling in Europe and North
Africa  and  private  meeting  with  National  Transitional  Council  of  Libya (NTC)
representatives in Paris, made Clinton shift her view as she saw the international support
for such a mission (Clinton,  2014:  367). In an interview,  Clinton stated that  the U.N.
backed intervention in Libya is “a watershed moment in international decision-making”
(ABC-News 2016). 
23 Thus, Clinton ultimately supported the intervention and formed a unified front with Rice,
Power, Smith and Rhodes. Why did Clinton change her mind? Iimportant for this change
were three preconditions: two diplomatic and one humanitarian. First, on March 12, the
Arab League came out in favor of a no-fly-zone. Over the following days on a trip to Paris,
Cairo  and  Tunis,  Clinton  met  with  both  Arab  leaders  and  with  those  of  the  Libyan
opposition. She reported back to Obama that the leaders in the region were serious and
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even willing to take part  in the military operation (Clinton,  2014:  370).  According to
Clinton this was not just “hollow calls for action”.5 
24 Second, British and French officials privately made clear that they not only wanted but
expected America to join them. According to Clinton, British Foreign Secretary William
Hague´s positive stand on a military intervention “counted for a lot” (Clinton, 2014: 368).
25 Third,  in  Libya,  Gaddafi´s  forces  were  approaching Benghazi  where  a  large  group of
civilians could soon be left defenseless at the hands of the Libyan troops. So, the horizons
for diplomacy were limited and Clinton took a decisive step: she came down on the side of
intervention, supporting the views of Rice and Power (Clinton, 2014: 373). Clinton argued
that absent international authorization, the U.S, would be stepping into a situation whose
consequences  are  unforeseeable.  (Clinton,  2014:  364,  367;  Chivvis,  2014:  55).  At  a
minimum, the Secretary of State had a responsibility to insists on multilateralism and it
was, thus, decisive for Clinton to reach consensus with U.S. allies and get legal support for
any military actions. 
26 Overall,  Clinton´s  view  played  a significant  role  in  influencing  President  Obama’s
decisions concerning Libya (Warrick 2011). Without her presence, it is quite possible that
the president would have relied more on Gates and his more cautious approach (Marsh,
2014b). President Obama was more reluctant to use force in the initial stages of the crisis
in Libya, when Gates seemed to have the upper hand, but he was more aggressive in the
latter stages beginning in mid-March 2011, when Clinton began to assert herself more
forcefully. 
27 Late in the afternoon of March 15, 2011, President Obama meets with members of his NSC
in the Situation Room of the White House. Mullen laid out the plans for a no-fly zone. The
president asked Mullen whether this no-fly zone would stop the possible bloodbath in
Benghazi. “No sir”, said Mullen. “Then why are we focusing on a no-fly zone? I want more
options”, asked the president (Sanger, 2012: 343). The NSC meeting restarted at nine and
this time the president was presented a range of military options. One was to use no
American force at all, but simply to provide intelligence and other support for the French
and the British. Another was the no-fly-zone. The third was to go beyond the no-fly-zone
by sending out planes to strike at Libyan targets at the ground. They went around the
table and Gates again voiced his reservations. Clinton was out of the country but had
made her views in favor of intervention known in advance (Cooper and Myers, 2011).
Finally, the president chose the third military option (Mann, 2012: xiii). Rice and the NSC
advisers argued that a no-fly zone would lead to unavoidable further military action, and
this aspect should therefore be permitted in any U.N. resolution (Morris and Usborne,
2011). 
28 On March 16, Rice signaled publicly for the first time that the Obama administration
supported the Security Council´s discussion of further international steps, including a no-
fly  zone in Libya (Rice  2011).  According to  Rice,  it  was  necessary to  be  prepared to
contemplate steps that  might  go beyond,  a  no-fly zone given that  a  no-fly  zone has
inherent limitations in terms of protection of civilians at immediate risk (Rice, 2011). One
day later, following several rounds of diplomatic negotiations, the UN Security Council
passed  Resolution  1973,  which  authorized  a  no-fly  zone  and  the  use  of  all  means
necessary  short  of  foreign  occupation  to  protect  civilians  (UNSC  Resolution,  1973).6
Among others, Clinton argued that absent international authorization, the U.S, would be
stepping  into  a  situation  whose  consequences  are  unforeseeable (Chivvis,  2014:  55;
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Clinton, 2014: 364). The UNSC mandate provided the operation with a legal basis, and
thereby one obstacle to U.S. military involvement had disappeared. 
 
Domestic Political Constraints, 15 March-19 March
29 President Obama had entered office at a time when public opinion of the U.S.  in the
Middle  East  had  fallen  to  historic  lows  (Chivvis,  2014:  19-20).  The  American  public
regarded the Iraq and Afghanistan wars as expensive adventures that had largely failed to
achieve  their  objectives.  Public  opinion  polls  showed  on  15-19  March  that  the  vast
majority of Americans were concerned about the situation in Libya, but did not consider
it to be the responsibility of the US to handle. For example, a Pew Research Center (2011)
poll showed that the U.S. public expressed significant war-weariness since 63 percent of
the public said that the U.S. did not have any responsibility to act in Libya. 51 percent of
the public approved that this was related to already overcommitted forces. In addition,
US public opinion strongly opposed even a limited role for the U.S.,  only 13 percent
emerged in public support for the introduction of US ground forces into the conflict.
Indeed, polls expressed concern over objectives in Libya and according to one Gallup poll
the support for the airstrikes in Libya was only 47 percent, which comparatively is lower
than for other recent U.S. military actions (Gallup, 2011). Consequently, President Obama
faced an American public  that  was reluctant  and skeptical  to  employing US military
forces in humanitarian interventions. 
30 Concerns of how the public would react to use of force was expressed by, among others,
Vice President Joe Biden, who thought that getting involved in Libya was stupid and,
politically, nothing but downside, and Chief of Staff Daley who asked how the U.S. are
going to explain to the American people “why we´re in Libya” (Hastings, 2011; Lewis,
2012). On several occasions, President Obama emphasized the limited nature and scope of
OOD and that any ground troops would not be deployed to Libya (Obama, 2011a; 2011b).
Thus, the Administration’s desire to uphold at least a modicum of public support shaped
both  the  nature  of  the  operation  as  well  as  President  Obama’s  official  statements
concerning OOD (Marsh 2014a). 
31 Also in relation with Congress President Obama emphasized the limited nature of OOD. It
is clear that the president anticipated Congressional opposition to any use of force in
Libya. In his official letter to Congress on March 21, he explicitly pondered on the limited
nature of  the operation (Obama, 2011b).  The president  restated that  OOD would not
involve  U.S.  ground troops  and that  operational  control  would  quickly  transition  to
NATO: 
The United States has not deployed ground forces into Libya. United States forces
are  conducting  a  limited  and  well-defined  mission  in  support  of  international
efforts to protect civilians and prevent a humanitarian disaster. (…) We will seek a
rapid,  but  responsible,  transition  of  operations  to  coalition,  regional,  or
international  organizations  that  are  postured  to  continue  activities  as  may  be
necessary to realize the objectives of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1970 and
1973 (Obama, 2011b).
32 Congressional  support  for  any kind of  military  involvement  in  Libya was  low.  Given
budget cuts and the expensive wars in Afghanistan and Iraq the money was not available.
Republicans in Congress was not interested in giving the president unrestricted authority
for OOD. For example, Senator Mark Begich (D-AK) questioned Gates about the financial
cost of OOD and how the Administration intended to pay for it (Toohey 2011). Based on
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this, Congress in effect constrained the politically feasible policy options available to the
Obama administration. In view of that, a small-scale air and naval campaign and quick
turnover of command and primary operational role appeared to be the best available
alternative to achieve the president’s objectives in Libya (Marsh, 2014a). 
33 On March 19, cruise missiles and bomber strikes from a U.S.-led coalition destroyed Libya
´s air-defense systems, forced Qaddafi’s armored columns to retreat and, established a no-
fly  zone  over  the  country  (Chivvis,  2014:  3).  The  president’s  multiple  references  to
limiting US involvement and exclude ground troops in the Libya intervention reflect
decision-making consideration of both public opinion and Congress and its impact on
OOD.  Both the American general  public  and Congress acted as constraining domestic
political factors and influenced the decision to limit the scope and duration of OOD. As
demonstrated  below,  however,  the  Libya  decision  also  involved  calculations  of  self-
interest at the international level. 
 
NATO, Strained Resources and Burden-Sharing, 20-27 March 
34 On 20 March 2011, when French air-strikes destroyed a Gadhafi regime column about to
storm  Benghazi,  the  Obama  Administration  announced  that  the  U.S.  was  taking  a
supporting role in the conflict and would quickly transfer control of the operation to
NATO (Sanger, 2012: 352-353). Two weeks later, command of the military operation to
enforce UN Security Council  Resolution 1973 passed from the U.S.  to NATO. The U.S.
withdrew forces from direct combat on 4 April, although the United States continued to
play a major supporting role. Why was it so important to restrict the U.S. role and let
NATO take control of the operation? 
35  The Obama Administration inherited a military that was exhausted by a decade of wars
in  Iraq  and  Afghanistan.  The  president  himself  believed  that  a  large-scale  ground
operation in Libya was an insensible use of US military resources. Obama maintained that
the massive ground force deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan were mistakes that should
not  be  replicated  in  Libya  or  elsewhere  (Obama,  2011c). Besides,  the  Department  of
Defense was facing impending series of major defense spending cuts in response to the
economic downturn and facing the American political system throughout the spring and
summer 2011. These heavy reductions placed an immediate constraint on current and
future U.S military operations (March, 2014: 127).7 
36 Between 20-21 March, Ivo Daalder, U.S. Ambassador to NATO, worked to bring operations
under NATO command. Daalder was able, in part of his own connections to the White
House, to make the argument for NATO at multiple levels within the U.S. government.
Others agreed and by March 21, a consensus was forming in Washington (Chivvis, 2014:
71). President Obama worked out a deal with British prime minister Cameron and French
president Sarkozy under which the United States would help initiate the air campaign
over Libya, and then, after a few days, let Britain and France and other NATO allies and
partners take over the work. 
37 Administration officials described Obama’s strategy as one that was more focused and
favored “smaller footprints” and the leveraging of unique US capabilities (Gates, 2011b).
Thus, OOD denoted a new development in how the U.S. conducted military operations.8 
The President also explained in his March 21, report to Congress that the use of military
force in Libya serves important U.S. interests in preventing instability in the Middle East
and preserving the credibility and effectiveness of the UNSC. The President also stated
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that he intended the anticipated United States military operations in Libya to be limited
in nature, scope, and duration (Obama, 2011a). 
38 On 25 March, NATO Allied Joint Force Command in Naples took command of the no-fly
zone over Libya and combined it with the ongoing arms embargo operation under the
name Operation Unified Protector (OUP). NATO offered several benefits. First of all, the
organization  had  well-established  working  relationships  with  non-NATO  European
powers and Arab states that had offered to participate. NATO also had command and
control  systems  that  could  bring  the  broad  coalition  that  would  participate  in  the
operation together into a single, coordinated chain of command (Chivvis, 2014: 71). 
39 On 27 March, NATO assumed full responsibility for the no-fly zone and all other military
aspects of the UN Security Council resolution. The president believed that the USA should
play more of a supporting role and encourage its allies to shoulder more of the burden in
military operations. In fact, one of Barack Obama’s consistent aims has been to convince
old allies to assume greater responsibility for global security.  The administration has
repeatedly made clear that the United States will be less keen than its predecessors to
intervene abroad. Obama spoke to this new conception of US leadership in a speech on
March 28 where he stated that “we should not be afraid to act – but the burden of action
should not be America’s alone. As we have in Libya, our task is instead to mobilize the
international community for collective action” (Obama, 2011b).9 
40 Obama also  emphasized how the limited,  supporting role  of  the U.S.  in  OOD greatly
reduced the cost of operations. Washington’s calls for burden-sharing with allies are not
new and the positive experiences from Libya together with an increased focus on Asia-
Pacific should indicate that the US will continue to encourage European allies to assume a
larger responsibility for its geographical neighborhood. Yet, the administration distanced
itself from the description of having “led from behind” in Libya after critics meant it
implied lacking US leadership on the international arena. 
41 There were additional national security benefits to the limited U.S. role. First of all, the
realist component of OOD was to set forth a model of U.S. leadership at the international
level. As argued by Ben Rhodes “If we were to sit this one out, it would have sent a signal
that the U.S. isn´t really a leader (Mann, 2014: 293). President Obama, thus, made it clear
that the US will not hesitate to lead ‘wars of necessity’ in defence of European allies. But it
will not take the lead in ‘wars of choice’ in or around Europe, such as the one in Libya.
Such a stance advances Obama’s goal of conserving US strength in time of economic crisis
and  military  overstretch:  a  reduction  in  non-essential  engagements  saves  money.  A
second national security side benefits to the limited role was that other NATO countries-
at least the British and French- were willing to take responsibility for a large share of the
war. In other words, in the Libya case allies were both paying their share end willing. The
president’s  multiple allusions to restricting US involvement,  lower costs,  and sharing
burdens also reflect consideration of self-interests and its impact on foreign policy.
 
Conclusion
42 President Obama´s decision to launch a limited air operation on Libya can be seen as the
result of a combination of factors: altruism; the legal basis and international support for
the operation; domestic political constraints and the possibility to limit U.S. participation
and transfer  control  to  NATO.  Without  one of  the factors,  the president  might  have
picked another alternative than an air operation. Altruism within the “interventionist”
Interacting Interests: Explaining President Obama´s Libyan Decision
European journal of American studies, 13-2 | 2018
9
group at the NSC seems to have been necessary for creating a sense of obligation to act on
the part of the administration. This obligation to act became stronger when Clinton saw
the international support together with the legal basis for OOD, which was provided by
the mandate from the UN Security Council  on March 17.  The constraining factors of
Congress,  the  public  and  strained  resources  influenced  the  timing  and  scope  of  the
intervention in which the president perceived that U.S. could act without detriment to its
self-interest at the domestic political and international level, respectively. 
43 How did the four circumstances interact with each other in the decision-making process?
44 First, it is possible to observe some interactive effects linking feelings of altruism and
international  legal  authorization.  The  perceived  feelings  of  altruism  of  the
“interventionist” group increased their hopes that the UN would be able to authorize a
military operation, and when Resolution 1973 was adopted, the moral obligation of Rice,
Power,  and  eventually  Clinton  was  reinforced  further.  Given  the  legal  basis  and
international support for OOD it became more difficult for the Obama administration to
stay outside a military mission, because of their previous officially declared feelings of
altruism  in  relation  to  Libya.  Second,  the  possibility  to  transfer  control  to  NATO
contributed to the decision to limit U.S. participation. Without the interactive effects of
these two factors, the government’s commitment to Libya would most likely have been
limited to verbal  condemnation of  Gaddafi  and to humanitarian support.  Hence,  it  is
possible to find interactive effects among some of the factors, but not among all of them.
Consequently, the way in which different factors interact in US foreign policy should be
examined further in detailed case studies as well as in comparative case studies (Doeser
2014).
45 What  are  the  comparative  implications  of  this  examination  of  OOD?  First,  the
combination of factors could be used as an analytical tool for examining other decisions
on humanitarian intervention made by the U.S. or other liberal democratic states. When
some Western powers considered an intervention in Syria in August–September 2013,
President Barack Obama stated that a “red line” for US intervention in Syria would come
if the Syrian regime used chemical weapons. But when evidence emerged that Syria's
forces had used sarin gas in an attack that killed nearly 1,500 people in Damascus, Obama
eventually backed down after threatening a military response.10 Although the Obama
administration had a clear humanitarian purpose for joining an intervention in Syria, the
operation would have lacked international authorization and support. Based on this, he
would not have been able to transfer the operation to NATO. Thus, without one of the
conditions, the U.S. will most likely not participate in the particular operation, and, here,
two out of four circumstances were absent. In addition, the domestic political constraints
in this case were even stronger given that the president sought congressional approval
for military intervention in Syria, which he was not likely to get.
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NOTES
1. For an exception see March, (2014a) who examine and test the precepts of neoclassical
realism on OOD. 
2. For  a  discussion  of  U.S.  decision-making  in  this  case,  see Clinton,  (2014);  Gates,  (2014);
Hastings, (2011); Lewis, (2012); Mann, (2014); Sanger, (2012).
3. Other actors skeptical of another military commitment for over-stretched U.S. forces included
Vice President Biden, CJCS Admiral Mullen, National Security Adviser Donilon, Counterterrorism
Chief John Brennan, Chief of Staff Daley- These actors expressed caution in how to handle the
Libyan situation. Enforcement of a no-fly zone would require scarce air assets, domestic political
approval, and international authorization and divert resources from the wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq. 
4. Other  staff  members  within  this  group  included  Ben  Rhodes,  Gayle  Smith  and  Jeremy
Weinstein. Rhodes, as a speechwriter, would have to write the speech explaining the decision,
said that he preferred to explain why the United States had prevented a massacre over why it
hadn´t. See Lewis, (2012). 
5. Interview with Ben Rhodes, quoted in Mann, (2012: 290). 
6. The  resolution  also  supported  the  principle  of  the  Responsibility  to  Protect  (R2P)  by
emphasizing the responsibility of Libyan authorities to protect the civilian population.
7. Secretary Gates believed that a Libya intervention was not a vital national interest for
the United States and he expressed concerns for how overstretched and tired the military
was. In a testimony before the Senate, he said that taking on another major commitment
is “a very great worry for me”. In meetings, Gates would ask, “Can I just finish the two
wars we´re already in before you go looking for new ones? (Gates, 2014: 511-512). 
8. The American element of the operation was largely restricted to knocking out Libyan
air defenses in order to allow NATO and allied aircraft to establish the UN-mandated no-
fly  zone  and  then  providing  support  to  NATO  and  allied  forces  as  they  conducted
interdiction. 
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9. President Obama also declared that; “Because contrary to the claims of some, American
leadership is not simply a matter of going it alone and bearing all of the burden ourselves.
Real leadership creates the conditions and coalitions for others to step up as well; to work
with allies and partners so that they bear their share of the burden and pay their share of
the costs; and to see that the principles of justice and human dignity are upheld by all”
(Obama, 2011b). 
10. The president eventually brokered a deal with Russia that saw Assad agreeing to
destroy most of the regime's arsenal of chemical weapons.
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attempt to trace the process by which Obama came to the decision to use force in Libya by
relying on a multitude of different sources, such as government reports, speeches and remarks,
parliamentary records, media coverage, secondary sources.
INDEX
Keywords: Operation Odyssey Dawn, the United States, foreign policy decision-making,
humanitarian intervention, domestic politics
AUTHOR
MIKAEL BLOMDAHL
Mikael Blomdahlis currently Assistant Professor in Political Science at at Stockholm University.
He was awarded a PhD in 2009 for a thesis on the domestic political impact on U.S. foreign policy.
His recent publications include articles in Comparative Strategy, Diplomacy and Statecraft and
Armed Forces and Society. His primary research interests are Foreign Policy Analysis, U.S.
foreign policy and humanitarian interventions.  
Interacting Interests: Explaining President Obama´s Libyan Decision
European journal of American studies, 13-2 | 2018
15
